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THE MOST  RECENT  WEAKNESS  in the monetary aggregates has reopened 
basic  questions  about  the stance  of monetary  policy.  The pattern  of mark- 
edly slow rates of growth  has been especially  evident  in M1. In the six 
quarters  preceding  1978:4, M1  grew at an average  annual  rate of nearly 
8 percent,  about 3 percentage  points below the growth  rate of nominal 
GNP. But in that  fourth  quarter,  M1  slowed  to a 4.3 percent  annual  rate, 
while  GNP expanded  at a 15.6 percent  rate;  moreover,  in 1979:  1, M1  de- 
clined,  while nominal  GNP expanded  at a 9.5 percent  annual  rate. 
There are striking  similarities  between the behavior  of M1 in recent 
months  and the prolonged  weakness  in this aggregate  from mid-1974 to 
early 1977. In both  periods,  M1  grew  at a much  slower  rate  than  that  pre- 
dicted  using historical  relationships  among  M1,  GNP, and interest  rates. 
This weakness  can be seen in table 1, which shows predicted  and actual 
levels and  growth  rates  of M1,  based  on a conventional  M1  demand  equa- 
tion. From  the period  beginning  in mid-1974  to 1977:  1, the error  in pre- 
dicting  M1  cumulated  to $34 billion as the actual annual  growth  rate of 
M1 averaged  about 3.5 percentage  points less than that predicted.  From 
1978:3 to 1979:  1, the M1 error  grew by $15 billion, as the actual M, 
growth  rate  averaged  almost  7.5 percentage  points  less than  that  predicted. 
In each of these periods  of unusually  slow money growth,  legislative 
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Table 1. Actual  and  Predicted  Values  and  Errors  from a Dynamic  Simulation  of an 
M1  Demand  Equation,  1974:3-1979  :1 
Annualized  rate of growth  Level  (billions  of dollars  or  percent) 
Year  and  (percent  or  percentage  points) 
quarter,  and  Cumulative 
summary  Pre-  Pr  e-  Cumulative  percentage 
statistic  Actutal dicted  Error  Actual  dicted  error  errora 
Year  and  quarter 
1974:3  4.0  7.9  -4.0  279.0  284.0  -5.0  -1.8 
4  4.6  8.6  -4.0  282.1  290.1  -8.0  -2.8 
1975:1  2.1  8.5  -6.4  283.6  296.3  -12.6  -4.5 
2  5.7  8.9  -3.2  287.7  302.9  -15.2  -5.3 
3  7.3  9.2  -1.9  292.9  309.9  -16.9  -5.8 
4  3.0  9.2  -6.2  295.1  317.0  -21.9  -7.4 
1976:1  4.6  9.6  -5.1  298.5  324.6  -26.1  -8.8 
2  6.4  8.6  -2.2  303.3  331.6  -28.3  -9.3 
3  4.2  7.8  -3.6  306.5  338.1  -31.6  -10.3 
4  7.4  8.0  -0.5  312.1  344.8  -32.7  -10.5 
1977:1  7.4  8.6  -1.2  317.9  352.2  -34.3  -10.8 
2  7.4  9.0  -1.6  323.8  360.1  -36.3  -11.2 
3  8.7  8.2  0.5  330.8  367.5  -36.7  -11.1 
4  7.4  7.4  -0.0  336.9  374.3  -37.4  -11.1 
1978:1  6.7  7.0  -0.3  342.5  380.8  -38.3  -11.2 
2  9.2  9.4  -0.2  350.4  389.7  -39.4  -11.2 
3  8.2  8.5  -0.3  357.5  398.0  -40.5  -11.3 
4  4.3  8.6  -4.3  361.4  406.5  -45.1  -12.5 
1979:1  -2.4  8.2  -10.6  359.2  414.9  -55.7  -15.5 
Summary  statistic 
Mean error  -2.9  -29.6 
Mean absolute  error  3.0  29.6 
Root-mean-square  error  4.0  32.3 
Sources: Actual values are from the Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve System. Predicted 
values are from a dynamic simulation of the Ml equation in the appendix, table A-1. This equation uses 
the same specification and sample period (1960:4 to 1974:2) as the equation for Ml reported in "A Pro- 
posal for Redefining Monetary Aggregates,"  Federal  Reser-ve  Bulletin, vol. 65 (January 1979), p. 26. Figures 
are rounded. 
a.  Cumulative error as a percent of actual level. 
and regulatory  changes  have created  new kinds of deposits  or permitted 
expanded  use of existing  ones, contributing  to some substitution  of other 
financial  assets  for M1.  The recent  weakness  in M1  has coincided  with  the 
introduction  of automatic  transfer  services (ATS) in November 1978. 
ATS has encouraged  the shifting  of funds  from  demand-deposit  accounts 
to savings  accounts.  During  the earlier  period  of weak M1  growth,  nego- 
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thrift  institutions  in New England and share drafts from credit unions 
emerged,  providing  individuals  with an explicit  return  on checkable  bal- 
ances. In addition,  commercial  banks were authorized  to offer savings 
accounts  to domestic  government  units in November 1974 and to busi- 
nesses in November  1975. Such new accounts  encouraged  some deposit 
holders to shift funds from demand-deposit  accounts.  However, Board 
staff  estimates  indicate  that such developments  can explain  no more  than 
one-fourth  of the estimated  shortfall  in M1  growth  shown  in table 1 during 
the earlier  period,  and  that  ATS can explain  only about  one-fourth  of the 
weakness  during  the most recent  period.' Furthermore,  technical  expla- 
nations  that are sometimes  suggested,  such as growth  in Federal  Reserve 
float,  do not account  for  much,  if any,  of the  weakness.2 
Finally, table 2 confirms  that, during  each period  of weakness  in M1, 
sizable  forecast  errors  also emerged  in M2.  Table 2 shows that, by early 
1977, the cumulative  overprediction  from  a standard  M2  equation  slightly 
exceeded  the $34 billion  overprediction  of M1.  Since 1978:3, the level of 
the M2  error  increased  by almost  twice as much  as the M1  error.  Thus  the 
weak  growth  in M1  cannot  be explained  by the substitution  of savings  and 
time  deposits  for  demand  deposits.3 
It is important  to note that,  in both  periods,  weakness  in the aggregates 
emerged  at a time  when short-term  interest  rates  were at historically  high 
levels.  Meanwhile, other financial instruments-security repurchase 
agreements  (RPs) and  money-market  mutual  funds-apparently became 
more widely  used as deposit  substitutes.  In the next section the analysis 
focuses on the relationship  between  high interest  rates, the weakness  in 
monetary  aggregates,  and the role of these new instruments. 
The Cash-Management  Process 
Much of the weakness  in demand  deposits  relative  to GNP in recent 
years  has  been  in the deposit  holdings  of nonfinancial  corporations,  which 
1. Board staff estimates suggest that the introduction of ATS accounts nation- 
wide and NOW accounts in New York depressed  M1 growth by about 1 percentage 
point at an annual rate in 1978:4 and by nearly 3 percentage  points in 1979:1. 
2.  From 1978:4 to early 1979, Federal Reserve float became large (but recently 
it has returned to a more normal level),  while Ml was virtually unchanged during 
this period. 
3. The weakness in M1 has been entirely attributable  to the demand-deposit  com- 
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Table  2. Actual  and  Predicted  Values  and  Errors  from a Dynamic  Simulation  of an 
M2 Demand  Equation,  1974:3-1979 :1 
Annualized  rate of growth  Level  (billions  of dollars  or percent) 
Year  and  (percent  or percentage  points) 
quarter,  and  Cumulative 
summary  Pre-  Pre-  Cumulative  percentage 
statistic  Actual  dicted  Error  Actual  dicted  error  errora 
Year  and  quarter 
1974:3  6.1  7.6  -1.5  599.9  604.1  -4.2  -0.7 
4  6.6  8.2  -1.6  609.8  616.5  -6.7  -1.1 
1975:1  6.4  9.5  -3.0  619.6  631.1  -11.5  -1.9 
2  9.5  10.6  -1.1  634.3  647.9  -13.5  -2.1 
3  10.0  9.9  0.1  650.2  664.0  -13.8  -2.1 
4  6.8  11.0  -4.2  661.2  682.2  -21.0  -3.2 
1976:1  10.5  13.0  -2.5  678.6  704.3  -25.7  -3.8 
2  10.0  11.7  -1.7  695.5  724.9  -29.3  -4.2 
3  8.8  10.9  -2.1  710.9  744.7  -33.8  -4.8 
4  12.6  11.7  0.9  733.3  766.4  -33.1  -4.5 
1977:1  10.9  12.2  -1.2  753.3  789.7  -36.4  -4.8 
2  9.0  12.1  -3.1  770.3  813.6  -43.3  -5.6 
3  10.0  10.6  -0.6  789.6  835.1  -45.5  -5.8 
4  7.9  9.2  -1.3  805.3  854.3  -49.0  -6.1 
1978:1  7.0  8.4  -1.4  819.3  872.3  -53.0  -6.5 
2  8.4  10.3  -1.9  836.6  894.7  -58.2  -7.0 
3  9.9  10.3  -0.5  857.3  917.9  -60.6  -7.1 
4  7.7  10.3  -2.6  873.9  941.6  -67.8  -7.8 
1979:1  1.6  9.8  -8.2  877.4  964.8  -87.3  -10.0 
Summary  statistic 
Mean error  -2.0  -36.5 
Mean absolute  error  2.1  36.5 
Root-mean-square  error  2.7  42.6 
Sources: Same as table 1, but using the M2 equation. Figures are rounded. 
a.  Cumulative error as a percent of actual level. 
also became  major  lenlders  of RP funds.4  While  it is tempting  to conclude 
that weakness  in M1  simply  reflects  the substitution  of such liquid assets 
4.  For econometric evidence see, for example, Helen T. Farr, Richard  D. Porter, 
and Eleanor M. Pruitt, "Demand Deposit Ownership Survey," in Improving the 
Monetary Aggregates: Staff Papers (Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve 
System, 1978), pp. 91-116.  Also note that from 1970:2 to 1978:4 the ratio of per- 
sonal income to gross demand  deposits of consumers  increased  by 16.5 percent,  while 
the ratio of total business sales to gross demand deposits of nonfinancial  businesses 
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for demand  deposits,  it is our view that these developments  are part  of a 
general  process  of intensified  cash  management. 
Several  developments  lie behind  this  more  intensive  cash  management. 
During  the 1970s  it has  become  less costly  for corporate  cash  managers  to 
invest  excess demand  balances  in the money  market.  The cost of moving 
funds  from  accounts  with  local or regional  banks  to a money-market  asset 
has fallen in real terms.  Improved  information  systems  and forecasting 
procedures  have been introduced,  which reduce uncertainties  regarding 
near-term  cash  flows  and  thereby  permit  profitable  reductions  in demand- 
deposit balances.  Moreover,  high market  rates of interest  in 1973-74, 
1978, and early  1979 have  increased  the incentive  for managers  to imple- 
ment new cash-management  techniques.  Reports  indicate  that large cor- 
porations  began to modify their cash-management  procedures  starting 
about 1973 and  that  many  smaller  corporations  have begun  to utilize  the 
newer  techniques  during  the  past  two  years. 
These developments  can be readily  interpreted  within  the established 
inventory  theory  of the  demand  for money  by firms.5  Given  the  uncertainty 
about  day-to-day  cash  flows,  deposit  holdings,  m, will be positively  related 
to the transactions  costs, t, of exchanging  deposits  for interest-bearing  as- 
sets and to the standard  deviation  of net cash flows, a, and negatively 
related  to the opportunity  costs of holding  cash, r.6  By purchasing  cash- 
management  seivices to reduce  uncertainty  about  cash flows, a firm  may 
lower  its overall  inventory  costs-the  sum  of expected  transactions  costs, 
the opportunity  costs of expected  cash balances, and cash-management 
costs.7 When this activity  is profitable,  average  deposit holdings are re- 
duced.  Moreover,  as short-term  interest  rates  rise,  there  is a greater  incen- 
tive to increase  the use of cash-management  activities  so that  the demand 
for money  becomes  more  interest-elastic  at higher  interest  rates.8  Indeed, 
5.  See, for example, Merton H. Miller and Daniel Orr, "A Model of the Demand 
for Money by Firms," Quarterly  Joutrnal  of Economics, vol. 80 (August 1966), pp. 
413-35. 
6.  More specifically, in the Miller-Orr  model, expected cash holdings are given 
by 
4 {3to-I  IM. 
3  4rJ 
7.  See Richard D.  Porter and Eileen Mauskopf, "Cash Management and the 
Recent Shift in the Demand for Demand Deposits" (Board of  Governors of  the 
Federal Reserve System, Division of Research and Statistics,  n.d.). 
8. Ibid, pp.34-36. 218  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1979 
it appears  that industry  cost-benefit  ratios for evaluating  such activities 
depend  explicitly  on the level of short-term  rates. 
A variety  of cash-management  techniques  (for example,  lock boxes, 
control  disbursement,  payable-through  drafts,  forecasting  models,  and  in- 
formation  retrieval  systems) has improved  information  about near-term 
cash  flows.  From  interviews  with  corporate  cash  managers  and  bankers,  it 
appears  that  one of the most  popular  techniques  currently  in use is control 
disbursement.  This technique  increases  the information  that a firm  has at 
the time investment  decisions  are made about expected  clearings  against 
its account.  As a result,  the firm  can reduce  the amount  of balances  that 
it holds  to meet  any  unexpected  outflows  from  its account.9  On  the  receipts 
side, lock boxes serve a similar  function by increasing  certainty  about 
near-term  collected  balances.'0 
Another  cash-management  technique  that  has contributed  to the weak- 
ness in demand  deposits  is the cash-concentration  account,  which  permits 
the customer  to exploit economies  of scale that arise  from operating  one 
account  rather  than many scattered  accounts.  Using wire transfers  and 
depository  transfer  checks,  the firm  can consolidate  receipts  into a single 
concentration  account from which it funds disbursements.  Abstracting 
from  the costs of consolidating  accounts,  it can  be shown  that  the optimal 
9.  In control disbursement,  the firm typically maintains a zero or fixed balance 
account at a "remote"  bank which, because of its location, receives only one cash 
letter from the Federal Reserve early each day. When the information in the cash 
letter is sorted, the corporation is notified of the exact amount of funds needed to 
cover all clearings against  its account that day. The information  comes early enough 
in the day, usually by noon, so that a more accurate determination  can be made of 
funds available for  investment. Checking accounts at  other "nonremote" banks 
usually are such that the firm will not know until late that day, or sometimes even 
until the next day, the amount of funds needed for clearing. This is because other 
banks may receive checks for clearing throughout  the day by picking up cash letters 
at Federal Reserve  offices  or through  direct  sends. 
10. The bank operating the lock box can notify the corporation daily (or more 
often)  when items received at the lock box become collected balances. There are 
two distinct effects associated with the use of lock boxes and control disbursement: 
information is received about cash flows and the timing of receipts and clearings is 
altered. Lock boxes and control disbursement  were initially marketed and utilized 
for the latter ("float") purpose. The gains from these activities may be quite large, 
and for some firms  they are probably  much larger than the gains from any reduction 
in uncertainty  about cash flow. However, it appears  that most firms  have increasingly 
realized the value of the accompanying  information gains. Moreover, it has become 
clear that such information gains can easily exceed the "float"  gains for firms with 
large variations  in daily clearings  or collections. Richard  D. Porter, Thomas  D. Simpson,  and Eileen Mauskopf  219 
amount  of cash in the concentration  account  is always  less than  the opti- 
mal cash  balance  held when  separate  accounts  are  maintained,  even  when 
net receipts  in the different  accounts  are perfectly  correlated.  However, 
when costs are associated with consolidating  funds, the decision of 
whether  to concentrate  accounts  depends  on the costs of concentrating 
relative  to the gains.  Tending  to lower the consolidation  costs are the re- 
duced  personnel  and  management  costs  of operating  only one account  and 
the advantage  of spreading  any  fixed  brokerage  fee over more  investment 
dollars.  Because the gains from consolidation  increase  with the rate of 
interest,  there is more incentive  to concentrate  when interest rates are 
high. 
Coinciding  with the increased  use of cash-management  techniques  has 
been the growing  volume  of very  short-term  liquid  assets  such as RPs and 
money-market  mutual funds. In fact, many have argued that recent 
periods of weakness  in demand deposits can be traced mainly to the 
growth  in RPs and  to money-market  mutual  funds.-- 
The arguments  attributing  the weakness  in M, to the growth  in these 
short-term  liquid assets must be interpreted  carefully.  The traditional 
theory  of money demand  is built around  the notion that changes  in the 
yield on an interest-bearing  asset or changes in the cost of converting 
interest-bearing  assets  into money  will affect  money  holdings.  Since  RPs 
have lower transactions  costs than many other assets of comparable 
yields,  their  introduction  and  incorporation  into cash-management  strate- 
gies might be expected  to reduce the volume of demand deposits held 
at any  given  interest  rate.  But  what  is sometimes  argued  is that  the demand 
for money has not really changed,  but instead  is being incorrectly  mea- 
11. See P. A. Tinsley, B. Garrett,  and M. E. Friar, "The Measurement  of Money 
Demand" (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Special Studies Sec- 
tion, November 1978); Gillian Garcia and Simon Pak, "Some Clues in the Case of 
the Missing Money," American Economic Review, vol. 69 (May 1979, Papers and 
Proceedings,  1978), pp. 330-34; and John Wenninger  and Charles Sivesind, "Chang- 
ing the MI Definition: An Empirical Investigation"  (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, April 1979). 
The recent growth of money-market  mutual funds is impressive.  Such funds have 
grown from about $8.1 billion at the end of September  1978 to about $18.2 billion in 
early April. Since these accounts have low brokerage  fees, high overnight  yields, and 
are checkable, it is conceivable that two-thirds  of the increase in the M1 error in the 
recent period can be assigned to this source. That is, suppose the $10 billion increase 
in these funds comes only at the expense of household and corporate  demand-deposit 
balances. Because of the economies of scale involved in pooling receipts and dis- 
bursements,  the mutual funds surely hold less than $1 billion in demand deposits. 220  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1979 
sured.  By including  RPs in the narrowest  monetary  aggregate,  no weak- 
ness in this aggregate  would emerge because the sum of M, plus RPs 
would behave as M, alone did previously.12  This argument  implies that 
RPs dominate  demand  deposits  by some  agents.'3 
In the case of money-market  funds, the question  of transactions  costs 
is moot.  Accounts  containing  such  funds are typically  checkable;  and for 
most funds  no charges  are made for drafts,  provided  that checks  exceed 
a minimum  amount.'4  The checkability  feature  and  the near-market  yield 
on money-market  funds  make  them  attractive  relative  to demand  deposits. 
If RPs and  money-market  mutual  funds  tend to dominate  money,  then 
the stability  of the M, demand  equations  might  indeed  be restored  by add- 
ing RPs or RPs and  money-market  mutual  funds  to M,. Table 3 provides 
the simulation  results  for a demand  equation  using  an M, specification  but 
estimated  for the sum of M, plus RPs at commercial  banks, and for the 
sum of M,  RPs, and money-market  mutual  funds. The table indicates 
that  the addition  of RPs can cut the demand  error  appreciably.  At the end 
of 1975 the cumulative  errors  in both the equation  for M, (table 1) and 
the equation  for the sum  of Ml and  RPs (table 3) were about  $20 billion. 
From 1975:4 to 1978:3, the  M, level error  doubled  in size,  while  the error 
in the equation  containing  RPs increased  by about half. Most recently, 
from 1978:3 to 1979:1, the M, error  increased  by an additional  $15 bil- 
lion, at a time  when  the error  for the sum  of M, and  RPs grew  by $10 bil- 
lion. A better  performance  was shown  by the broader  aggregate,  MI, RPs, 
and money-market  mutual  funds.  The table shows  that since 1976:1, the 
equation  for this  money  measure  has  predicted  quite  accurately. 
Should  we conclude  from this evidence  that RPs and money-market 
12. This argument  is set forth in Garcia and Pak, "Some Clues in the Case of the 
Missing Money." 
13. To be a dominant asset, the RP market must be active late in the day when 
firms know the amount of demand balances needed to cover net disbursements.  Al- 
ternatively, if the market closes earlier in the day, the returns on an RP must be 
large enough to cover potential overdraft charges or the penalty for breaking  an RP 
commitment. 
14. The checkability of  money-market funds is limited to some extent by the 
typical requirement that checks must exceed $500. However, the average size of 
checks written at commercial banks is  roughly $500. See  "Check Processing at 
Federal Reserve Offices,"  Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 65 (February 1979), p. 99. 
Other Board staff estimates suggest that about 10 percent of all checks written have 
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Table  3. Errors  from a Dynamic  Simulation  of a Money-Demand  Equation  for 
Alternative  Measures  of Money, 1974:  3-1979: 1 
Cumulative  error 
M1,  RPs, and  money-market 
Year  and  Ml and  RPs  mutualfunds 
auarter,  and 
summary  Billions  of  Billions  of 
statistic  dollars  Percent"  dollars  Percent" 
Year  and  quarter 
1974:3  -6.2  -2.1  -5.7  -1.9 
4  -8.8  -3.0  -7.4  -2.5 
1975:1  -14.1  -4.7  -11.4  -3.8 
2  -15.7  -5.2  -12.3  -4.0 
3  -15.7  -5.1  -12.5  -4.0 
4  -20.0  -6.5  -16.9  -5.4 
1976:1  -23.3  -7.4  -20.0  -6.3 
2  -23.1  -7.1  -19.9  -6.1 
3  -24.4  -7.4  -21.5  -6.4 
4  -24.5  -7.3  -21.4  -6.3 
1977:1  -26.6  -7.7  -23.3  -6.7 
2  -27.7  -7.9  -24.7  -6.9 
3  -26.6  -7.4  -23.8  -6.5 
4  -25.2  -6.8  -22.1  -5.9 
1978:1  -25.7  -6.8  -21.7  -5.7 
2  -28.4  -7.4  -22.9  -5.9 
3  -28.6  -7.3  -21.7  -5.4 
4  -29.5  -7.3  -21.0  -5.1 
1979:1  -38.8  -9.7  -25.2  -6.1 
Summary  statistic 
Mean error  -22.8  -18.7 
Mean absolute  error  22.8  18.7 
Root-mean-square 
error  24.0  19.6 
Sources: Same as table 1, but using the equation for the sum of Ml and security repurchase agreements 
at banks (RPs) and the equation for the sum of M1, RPs, and money-market mutual funds. Those equa- 
tions use the same specification as the M1 equation in the appendix, table A-1. The RP data used here 
are preliminary  and are under review by the Board staff. The RP series is believed to contain considerably 
more estimation error than the money stock  figures. Moreover, RP estimates for 1978:4  to  1979:1 are 
based  on  September 1978 call  report relationships and are likely to  be  revised, perhaps substantially, 
as some recent call reports information becomes available. 
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mutual  funds,  taken  together,  explain  the M1  puzzle?  In the early  period 
from mid-1974 to early 1976, they clearly do not help much, although 
more  recently  they  help considerably.  However,  results  in table 3 are  mis- 
leading insofar as part of the growth  in RPs and money-market  funds 
should  be related  to the increase  in their own yields over this period.  If 
these  equations  were  respecified  to include  the appropriate  own rates,  we 
expect the predicted  values would be higher and the errors  would be 
larger.'5  Put differently,  in the  most  recent  period,  how can  we be sure  that 
growth  in money-market  mutual  funds  or RPs has  not come  at the expense 
of time  and  savings  deposits  as well as  demand  deposits?16 
The econometric  evidence  indicating  that RPs can only account  for a 
portion  of the M1  shortfall  is reinforced  by some features  of the RP mar- 
ket. It is difficult  to substantiate  the allegation  that firms can convert 
demand  deposits  into RPs at the end of the day when they have perfect 
certainty  about  their  cash flow. Reports  based on interviews  suggest  that 
the volume of RPs negotiated  late in the day is small. Similarly,  alleged 
arrangements  in which  excess  demand  balances  are  automatically  invested 
at the end of the day  in RPs appear  to account  for only a small  fraction  of 
RPs. In fact, most RP transactions  are arranged  early  in the day and  they 
are rarely  allowed (by either  the bank or the nonbank  dealer) to be re- 
versed  at a later  point  in the day.  Also, cash managers  can choose from a 
variety  of alternatives  to commercial  bank  RPs having  similar  net returns, 
such as RPs with nonbank dealers, offshore dollar deposits, specially 
tailored  commercial  paper,  and  money-market  funds.'7 
15. Some crude empirical  work supports  these assertions.  When the federal funds 
rate (as a proxy for the own rate on RPs) was added as an independent  variable to 
the equation for the sum of Mi and RPs, the simulation  errors  were somewhat higher 
than those given in table 3. 
16. Recall that most recently the M2 error (in billions of dollars) has increased 
much more than has the Mi error. 
17. An RP arranged  with a commercial bank results in an immediate reduction 
in the public's  demand-deposit  balances,  while an RP arranged  with a nonbank  dealer 
or a similar transaction  with another nonbank institution does not lead to such an 
immediate decline in demand deposits. However, when the Federal Reserve uses the 
federal funds rate as the operating  target, the level of deposit holdings is essentially 
determined by demand; in this case, the effects of these other transactions on the 
money supply are likely to be the same. For example, the dealer could disburse  these 
funds by repaying  a maturing  RP or by acquiring  securities  from the nonbank  public; 
as a result, such funds would likely return  to private demand accounts. But, because 
the public does not want to hold these deposits, additional transactions will occur 
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Although  it might appear  that money-market  mutual  funds have dis- 
placed demand deposits, the evidence indicates  that the funds are not 
being used as demand  deposits. To date, industry  sources indicate  that 
only about one draft  per month  is written  on these accounts,  compared 
with  twenty-two  per month  on regular  demand-deposit  accounts.  In addi- 
tion,  the annual  turnover  rate  of the money-market  fund  obligations-that 
is, the dollar  volume  of redemptions  divided  by average  dollar  volume- 
appears  to average  only two and a half to three.  This rate  is substantially 
below  the annual  demand-deposit  turnover  rate  of about  one hundred  for 
accounts  at banks  outside  New York  City  and  only slightly  larger  than  the 
turnover  rates for all passbook savings accounts at commercial  banks. 
Finally, the typical money-market  fund account  is larger  than the usual 
transactions  account,  averaging  about $20,000 for stockbroker  and gen- 
eral purpose  funds and about $60,000 at funds restricted  to particular 
institutions. 
Given  the institutional  evidence  on RPs and  money  funds,  such  invest- 
ments  can best be viewed  as affecting  M1  through  their  role as buffers  to 
demand  deposits instead of as replacements  for demand deposits. For 
many individuals,  the money-market  funds apparently  serve as a more 
efficient  demand-deposit  buffer  than do passbook  savings  accounts;  cor- 
porations  have apparently  found money-market  funds and, to a greater 
degree,  RPs to be attractive  buffers.  An increase  in the yields on these 
assets would thus tend to constrain  M1 growth  in the same way that an 
increase  in the rate  on passbook  accounts  would.  Moreover,  these instru- 
ments  presumably  have attracted  funds from those assets that have tra- 
ditionally  acted as buffers  in addition  to drawing  funds from demand- 
deposit  balances.  A properly  specified  demand  equation  for these assets 
therefore  would  probably  have  to include  portfolio  considerations  in addi- 
tion  to transaction  elements. 
The above considerations  are consistent  with the implications  of the 
cash-management  process.  Cash-management  techniques  permit  firms  to 
conduct  a given scale of operations  with smaller  amounts  of demand  de- 
the central bank to stabilize short-term rates of  interest, these unwanted demand 
balances will tend to be removed from the system. The key issue is the length of 
time it takes for such demand  balances to be removed. If the time is sufficiently  brief, 
then a desire by the public to reduce its demand balances and to acquire dealer RPs 
will result in a reduction  in demand  deposits in much the same way as if the RPs are 
arranged with a commercial bank, even though the latter process will  be more 
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posits.  In other  words,  the cash-management  process  results  in a shift in 
the demand  for money  relative  to GNP. Nevertheless,  the role of RPs and 
money-market  funds in this process is important  in several  ways. First, 
even in the absence  of increasing  familiarity  with cash-management  prac- 
tices, the positive  overnight  yields to be earned  on these assets enhance 
their  use as a buffer  to demand  deposits  and  consequently  reduce  demand- 
deposit  balances.  Second,  the yields  increase  the incentive  to utilize  those 
cash-management  techniques  that reduce uncertainty  about near-term 
cash  flows,  thus  further  reducing  the level of demand  deposits. 
Incentives  for Cash  Management 
Technological  developments  and competitive  forces  in the market  for 
liquid  funds  have contributed  to reductions  in the public's  holdings  of de- 
mand  deposits  relative  to GNP. Computerization  has facilitated  the reg- 
ular monitoring  of cash balances and has improved the accuracy of 
cash-flow  forecasts.  Also, the growing availability  and convenience  of 
wire transfers  permit  funds to be transferred  readily  from one demand- 
deposit  account  of a firm  to another  or between  liquid  assets  and  demand 
accounts.  Moreover,  nonbank  institutions,  such as money-market  mutual 
funds,  and security  dealers  have intensified  their  efforts  to attract  a grow- 
ing share  of the public's  liquid  assets,  as have  foreign  banking  offices. 
These developments-the increasing  use of cash management  and the 
emergence  of new or more attractive  liquid  assets-might be viewed  as a 
consequence  of the legal prohibition  of interest  on demand  deposits  and 
the absence  of the  payment  of interest  on bank  reserves.  As a consequence, 
banks  have devised  methods  of paying  implicit  interest  on their  demand- 
deposit  balances.  At large  banks,  compensation  usually  takes  the form  of 
credit  services (typically  lines of credit) and cash-management  services. 
The imnplicit  compensation  rate paid on demand balances is generally 
tied to a money-market  rate, adjusted  for the proportion  held as idle 
required  reserves, and applied to collected balances in the account.'8 
18. Specifically, the rates on treasury bills  (usually with ninety-day maturity) 
are used to set an "earnings  credit rate." Compensating  balances are then equal to 
the value of services divided by the earnings credit rate, where this rate is the bill 
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These  implicit  rates  still  fall short  of the competitive  rate  because  required 
reserves  held  by member  banks  against  their  deposits  do not earn  interest. 
If a competitive  rate of interest  were  paid on required  reserves,  banks 
would  be able to offer  their  customers  more attractive  terms.  But even if 
interest  were  allowed  on demand  deposits  and  compensation  were  paid  on 
required  reserves,  demand  deposits  and  other  near-money  financial  instru- 
ments  would  have different  yields.  Because  demand-deposit  funds  can be 
deposited  or withdrawn  at any time during  the business  day, they have 
higher  reserve  management  costs for the bank than do very short-term 
investments.  Because  of these  higher  reserve  management  costs, the rates 
that would be offered on demand  balances  would fall short of market 
yields  on investments  with  very  short  maturities,  such as RPs.19  And cus- 
tomers  would continue  to have incentives  to use cash-management  tech- 
niques,  both to earn  the higher  rate  on near  money and to slow disburse- 
ments  and  speed  up  receipts. 
Interpreting  the Monetary  Aggregates 
The financial  innovations  discussed  above present  a number  of diffi- 
culties  for the interpretation  of the monetary  aggregates  and for the con- 
duct of monetary  policy. Some of these difficulties  can be reduced  by 
changing  the definitions  of the monetary  aggregates.  Indeed, the recent 
proposals  by the Board  staff  for redefining  the monetary  aggregates  take 
account  of important  developments  that  have altered  the deposit  liabilities 
of depository  institutions.20  The proposed  M1  contains  newly introduced 
transactions  deposits,  such as NOW and  ATS balances.  The proposed  M2 
19. This argument  is consistent with the observation that RPs arranged  early in 
the day generally have a higher yield than RPs placed later. If a bank or dealer held 
collateral until late in the day (when the customers are more certain of what their 
cash position will be),  then on average the RP issuer would be left holding excess 
collateral. To offset the possibility of such a loss, the issuer would be forced to offer 
a lower rate on RPs placed late in the day. Reports indicate that, under the circum- 
stances, customers prefer to receive a more favorable morning yield, thus incurring 
the costs of uncertainty  themselves. 
20.  "A Proposal for Redefining  the Monetary Aggregates,"  Federal Reserve Bul- 
letin, vol. 65 (January 1979), pp. 13-42. 226  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1979 
adds  to this savings  deposits  at all depository  institutions  on grounds  that 
recent  regulatory  changes  and competitive  pressures  have generally  en- 
hanced the liquidity  of all savings balances. Meanwhile, the growing 
illiquidity  of time deposits at all depository  institutions  has been recog- 
nized, and all such deposits  have been excluded  from the proposed  M2 
and  included  instead  in the proposed  M3.  However,  even these aggregates 
generally  do not have  stable  demand  functions. 
The instability  of the estimated  demand  functions  for the proposed 
aggregates  (and for the current  aggregates)  arises  largely  from  the funda- 
mental changes that are occurring  in the nature of deposits and near 
money. But we believe that the shifts of the demand  functions  arise at 
least as much  from the cash-management  process  discussed  earlier.  Cre- 
ating  an empirical  framework  for evaluating  and  predicting  the impact  of 
the cash-management  process is difficult,  however,  for several reasons. 
Historical  experience  with  the cash-management  process  is limited.  More- 
over,  the incentives  for continued  cash  management  are  closely  tied to the 
existence  of regulations,  high interest  rates, and technological  and com- 
petitive developments.  Thus it is quite difficult  to isolate the impact of 
each  of these  factors  on the demand  for money. 
The increasing  availability  of new money substitutes  poses an addi- 
tional  problem.  Some  of these  money  substitutes,  such as RPs, are  offered 
by domestic  banks;  others,  such as money-market  funds and short-term 
commercial  paper,  are available  at nonbank  institutions.  Eurodollars  are 
offered  by banking  offices  abroad-foreign banks  and  foreign  branches  of 
U.S. banks.  One could  deal  with  such  money  substitutes  by including  very 
short-term  liquid investments  in measures  of the monetary  aggregates. 
Thus M1-or  perhaps  some broader  aggregate-could include the RP 
liabilities  of commercial  banks and dealers,  money-market  funds, Euro- 
dollar holdings of U.S. residents,  short-term  commercial  paper, and so 
forth. 
While  a broader  money  measure  has some desirable  attributes,  it is un- 
likely  that  it would  bear  as close a relationship  to transactions  or GNP as 
demand  deposits  during  those  periods  when  the cash-management  process 
is relatively  dormant,  such as the period  prior  to mid-1974.  To the extent 
that the cash-management  process is unpredictable,  a broader  measure 
may have some "built-in  stability"  because much of the funds released 
from demand  deposits  will likely be placed in such short-term  buffers. 
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dominated  by motives besides transactions  demand  related  to income.2' 
For example,  asset  holders  may at times  want  to keep a large  proportion 
of their  financial  assets  in very  short-term  funds  for portfolio  reasons.  Ac- 
curately  predicting  such  movements  is difficult.  Furthermore,  the spectrum 
of available  liquid  assets  may expand  so that  funds  could shift  from  those 
buffers  included  in a particular  monetary  aggregate  to those  excluded  from 
the aggregate.22 
In principle,  one could separate  the total volume  of these buffers  into 
a portion  that is related  to portfolio  motives and one related  to transac- 
tions motives. The latter could then be combined  with ordinary  trans- 
actions  balances to form a new transactions-related  measure  of money 
along the lines of Tinsley,  Garrett,  and Friar.23  It is not clear, however, 
that econometric  procedures  have been refined  to the point where the 
transactions-related  portion  of such  instruments  can be reliably  separated 
from the remainder.  Moreover,  as noted above, to the extent that many 
financial  innovations  tend  to be part  of an ongoing  process  related  to cash- 
management  and competitive  pressures,  new instruments  are likely to 
appear as transactions  balances, requiring continued redefinition  of 
money. Alternatively,  data on the short-term  buffers  and cash-manage- 
ment developments  could be used to adjust  judgmentally  the growth  of 
the aggregates.  The  targeted  growth  in the monetary  aggregates  could  then 
be modified  to reflect  the impact  of such  developments. 
For the mid-1974 to early 1977 period, such ex post judgmental 
changes  would  undoubtedly  place adjusted  growth  in M1  and  M2  at rates 
closer  to the predicted  values  than to the actual  values  in tables 1 and 2. 
A similar  change  in the current  period  of apparent  weakness  would  show 
adjusted  growth  rates  somewhat  stronger  than  the measured  growth  rates. 
It is reasonable  to assume,  therefore,  that  targeted  growth  rates  of nominal 
GNP are consistent  with somewhat  slower  growth  in current  measures  of 
the monetary  aggregates  than the historical  relationships  suggest.  How- 
ever, given  the unpredictable  timing  and size of the shifts  in M1  demand, 
21. This point is elaborated  in Tinsley, Garrett,  and Friar, "The Measurement  of 
Money Demand." Restricting  the techniques  to overnight instruments  would reduce 
this problem but not eliminate it. Moreover, if such instruments  are included, why 
not include those maturing  in two days? A definitional  boundary  has to be arbitrarily 
drawn  somewhere,  but where? 
22. Any excluded instrument  having yields and transactions  costs similar to those 
included is likely to have a high elasticity of substitution  with included instruments. 
23. Tinsley, Garrett,  and Friar, "The Measurement  of Money Demand." 228  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1979 
it is likely  that  even the best adjustments  will be off the mark.  In such an 
environment,  it is more important  than ever that policymakers  supple- 
ment  information  on monetary  aggregates  with data on near money and 
other  financial  assets,  interest  rates, and direct  indicators  of current  and 
future  developments  in the economy. 
APPENDIX 
Appendix table A-1 shows estimated  equations  for money demand, 
based  on some  alternative  definitions  of the monetary  aggregates  discussed 
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